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MASSACHUSETTS
Houghton v. Johnson, 887 N.E.2d 1073 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008) (holding
the previous owner of upland property did not expressly sever tidal
flats from upland property, that the parties lacked the intent required
to find an implied easement, and that beach users failed to prove prescriptive easements in tidal flats).
In August 2004, LindaJean Johnson posted no trespassing signs on
the beach frontage seaward of her property on Cape Cod Bay in Eastham, Massachusetts. NancyJ. Houghton and fifty-nine other plaintiffs
(hereinafter "beach users") sought declaratory judgment on claims of
implied and prescriptive easements to allow their continued use of the
seaward portion of Johnson's property for customary beach activities.
The Land Court granted Johnson's motion for summary judgment.
The beach users appealed to the Appeals Court of Massachusetts, arguing that Johnson did not demonstrate ownership of the tidal flats,
and that the trial court erred in concluding the beach users did not
possess implied or prescriptive easements.
The court had to decide whether the previous landowner severed
the tidal flats from the upland property. To determine whether a
property owner severed tidal flats from the upland property in a conveyance, the court considered the presumed intent of the grantor, the
written conveyance, and the attendant circumstances. Here, the court
traced the title history of Johnson's property. A previous owner
showed no intent to sever the tidal flats: the previous owner failed to
reserve any right to the tidal flats in the deeds to later owners, and never claimed any interest in the flats. Because there was no evidence of
an express severance of the upland property from the tidal flats, title to
the tidal flats accompanied title to the upland property.
The court also addressed the issue of implied easement. An implied easement exists by the presumed intent of the parties, based on
the language of the conveyance in light of the circumstances, the physical condition of the premises, and the knowledge of the parties. The
court held that a 1924 plan for this subdivision did not indicate plans
for the property to be part of a community beach, nor was there any
evidence of a discernable pattern of language in the deeds to indicate
prior owner Houghton's intent to create a community beach. In addition, the beach users claimed long-standing use of the property as support for an implied easement. However, without a finding of an existing implied easement, the court saw no need to consider that argument.
The beach users claimed a prescriptive easement based on their
use of the property before Johnson owned the property. Each beach
user had the individual burden of establishing a prescriptive easement.
This required showing, by clear proof, that he or she used the property
in a manner that has been open, notorious, adverse to the owner, and
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continuous or uninterrupted over a period of no less than twenty years.
Here, none of the beach users established a prescriptive easement in
Johnson's property. The previous owner ofJohnson's property allowed
beach users to use the property, but exercised control in matters of
importance and concern to her, including directing beach users to stay
off the dunes. In addition, each beach user had to show more than a
collective, but individually sporadic and nonexclusive, use ofJohnson's
property for the court to grant a presumptive easement. However, the
beach users did not confine their use of the beach to Johnson's property; they used the seaward parts of many properties in the area. The
court held that none of the beach users had any right to use Johnson's
property seaward to the mean low water mark. However, the beach
users still had the right to fish, fowl, or navigate between the mean
high and mean low water marks of the property.
The court upheld the trial court's grant of summary judgment because Johnson owned the tidal flats and the beach users could not establish implied or prescriptive easements in the property.
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NEBRASKA
Upper Big Blue Natural Res. Dist. v. Neb. Dep't of Natural Res., 756
N.W.2d 145 (Neb. 2008) (holding that a state agency did not exceed its
authority in enacting a rule requiring consideration of hydrological
connections when determining the appropriated status of a river basin).
In 2006, the Nebraska Department of Natural Resources ("DNR"),
acting under authority of the Nebraska Ground Water Management
and Protection Act (the "Act"), determined that the Upper Platte River
Basin was fully appropriated. Such a determination imposed certain
restrictions with respect to the use of surface water and groundwater in
the affected geographic area. To reach this determination, the DNR
included a small geographic area located in the Big Blue River Basin
because there is a hydrological connection between its groundwater
and the surface water in the Upper Platte River Basin. The geographic
area located in the Big Blue River Basin was within the boundaries of
the Upper Big Blue Natural Resources District ("District").
The District sued the DNR in the District Court of Lancaster County, alleging that the DNR exceeded its statutory authority under the Act
when it considered a geographic area located in the Big Blue River
Basin as part of the fully appropriated Upper Platte River Basin. The
trial court found that the DNR did not exceed its authority and affirmed the actions of the DNR. The District appealed the trial court's
decision and the Supreme Court of Nebraska granted bypass of the
Court of Appeals.
The DNR adopted a rule that specified the method for determining areas within which the DNR considered surface water and ground-

